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SITUATION I 
GOODS ON NEUTRAL MEROHAN'l' VESSEL 
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral. 
A cruiser of X meets a private m:erchant vessel flying 
the flag of state Z. The papers of the vessel show that 
port 0 in state Y is the last port of .call for the merchant 
vessel. The vessel has the follo~wing cargo : One-sixth 
raw molasses and one-sixth petroleum, consigned to port 
P in state N; one-eighth iron ore and one-eighth fancy 
goods, consigned to port Q in state R; one-eighth fancy 
shoes for ladies, one-eighth golf suits for men, one-sixth 
valuable art-rug specimens for national museum, con-
signed to port 0. 
The master of the merchant vessel of state Z maintains 
that his vessel and cargo are not liable to seizure because 
of ratio and list of goods, consignment to neutral ports, 
geographical location of ports with referen.ce to belliger-
ents, and because the papers on board include a certifi-
cate of innocent character of goods from authorities of 
Z as well as a letter of assurance from the consul of Y 
at the port of departure. 
Are these grounds sufficient to exempt the merchant 
vessel from liability to seizure? 
SOLUTION 
The contentions of the master are not grounds suffi-
cient to exempt the merchant vessel fro1n liability to 
seizure. 
NOTES 
General.--While the subject of contraband has often 
been discussed at this Naval War College, it ·will be con-
I 
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venient to have a brief statement · in regard to the de-
velopinent of the principle in connection with this situa-
tion. Details as to other aspects of contraband may be 
found by reference to the General Index, International 
Lavv Publications, Naval \iV ar College, 1901-1920. 
Definition.-Contraband implies the existence of the 
idea of neutrality. The development of the idea of 
neutrality is comparatively recent. Grotius gave only 
scant reference to the subject and his great work first 
issued in 1625 was entitled" Law of vVar and Peace." 
While not using the term "contraband," Grotius . in 
1625 gave a classification of articles of commerce which 
has served as a basis for · the generally recognized dis-
tinctions. He enumerates: 
1. Those things which have their sole use in war, such as arms. 
2. Those things which have no use in war, as articles of luxury. 
3. Those things which have use bo ' h in war and out of war, 
as money, provisions, ships, anc1 those things pertaining to ships. 
(De Juri Belli ac Pacis, III, I, 5.) 
Grotius fu1!ther says, in regard to the conditions under 
which articles of the third class n1ay come: 
In the third class, objects of ambiguous use·, the state of war 
is to be considered. For if I cannot· defend myself except by 
intercepting what is sent, necessity, as elsewhere explained, gives 
us a right to intercept it, but under the obligation of restitution, 
except there· be cause to the contrary. If the supplies: sent 
impede the exaction of my rights, and if he, who sends th~m 
may know this,.-as jf I were besieging· a town or blockading a 
port, and if surrender or peace were expeeted, he will be bound 
to me for damages; as a person would who liberates my debtor 
from prison, or assists his flight to my injury; and to the 
extent of the· damage his property may be taken, and ownership 
thereof be assumed for the sake· of recovering my debt. If he 
have not yet caused damage, but have tried to cause it, I shall 
have a right by the retention of his property to compel h!m to 
give security for the future by hostages, pledges, or in some other 
way. But if, besides, the injustice of my enemy to me· be 
very evident, and he confirms him in a most unjust war, he 
will then be bound to me not only civilly, for the damage, but 
also criminally, as being one who protects a manifest criminal 
from the judge who is about to inflict punishment, and on that 
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ground it will be lawful to take such measures against him as 
are suitable to the offense, according to the principles laid down 
in speaking of punishment; and therefore to that extent he may 
be subjected to spoliation. (Whewell's. translation, Grotius, De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis~ III, I, 5.) 
The positions here taken by Grotius in regard to ·what 
is no'v termed " conditional contraband " would not no-vv 
be sustained even though his classification of contraband 
should be generally approved. 
Early practice.-1"'he classification made by Grotius 
was in no way his invention, for distinctions had been 
1nade 1nuch earlier than 1625, and Grotius stated the 
practice 'vhich had gro,vn up among nations. A treaty 
of Great Britain and Holland ( 1625) uses the word 
"contraband." A British proclan1ation of 1625 men-
tions that commerce 'vith the enen1y in the following 
articles is prohibited-
any manner of graine, or victualls, or any manner of provisio~s 
to serve to build, furnish, or arme any shipps of warr, or- any 
kind of munition for warr, or materials for the same, being not 
of the, nature of n1ere n1erchandize. 
A British proclan1ation made a fe,v months later is 
detailed. In this "His Maje.stie" denounces as pro-
hibited articles-
ordinance, armes of all sortes, powder, shott, match, brimstone, 
copper, jron, cordage of all kinds, hempe, saile, canvas, danuce 
pouldavis, cables, anchors, mastes, rafters, boate ores, balcks, 
capraves~ deale board, clap board, pipe staves, and vessels and 
-vessel staffe. pitch, tarr. rosen, okan1, corne, graine, and victualls 
of all sorts, all provisions of shipping, and all munition of warr, 
or of provisions for the same, according to former declarations 
and acts of state, made in this behalf in the tyme of Queen 
Elizabeth, of famous memorie. 
The practice before the days of Grotius had recog-
nized goods as liable to penalty, such as arn1s, and as 
free from penalty~ such as articles of luxury. Grotius 
endeavors to n1ake clear that a third class should be 
recognized, a class of use both for peaceful and for war-
like purposes. · 
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L ater .atti tudes.-As mar.itime commerce developed and 
as international trade became more and more important 
the demand for clear definitions of contraband became 
more imperative. From 1780, the time of the armed 
neutrality, neutrals "\vere more.positive in their assertion 
of their claim that property under neutral flags should 
be r espected, and the definit.ion of contraband became 
clearer. Even before this date the doctrine "free ships, 
free goods " had received strong support and had been 
embodied in treaties, but attempts to relieve commerce 
from interference became more frequent when stean1 and 
other forces removed .the barriers of space. 
This is evident in the case of the controversy in regard 
t o coal, which became important during the Crimean 
W ar ( 1854-1856) through the introduction of steam power 
in vessels of 'var. The Declaration of Paris 1nentions but 
does not define contraband. Great Britain maintained. 
that coal was an article a~ncipitis rusus and conditional con-
traband. Though Secretary Cass .in 1859 regarded the 
inclusion of coal as contraband as having "no just claim 
for support in the law of nations," in the Civil War, 
however, the Government of the United States con-
sidered coal as conditional contraband. Germany in 1870 
maintained that the export of coal from Great Britajn 
to France should be proh,ibited, and France reasserted 
her declaration of 1859 that coal under no circumstances 
should be considered contraband. 
Hall said regarding coal as conditional contraband: 
The view taken by England is unquestionably that which is 
most appropriate to the uses of the commodity with which it 
deals. Coal is employed so largely, and for so great a number of 
innocent pul'J)oses, the whole daily life of many nations is so 
dependent on it by its use for making gas, for driving locomotives, 
and for the conduct of the most ordinary industries, that no 
sufficient presumption of an intended warlike use is afforded 
by the simple fact of its destination to a belligerent port. But 
on the other band, it is in the highest degree noxious when 
employed for certain purposes; and when its destination to such 
purposes can be shown to be extremely probable, as by its con-
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signment to a port of naval equipment, or to a naval station, 
such as Bermuda, or to a place used as a port of call, or as a 
base of naval operations, it. is difficult to see any reason for 
sparing it which would not apply to gunpowder. One · article 
is as essential a condition of naval offense as is the other. (Hall's 
Int. Law, 8th ed., p. 786.) 
Different classifioations.-The classification of articles 
carried to a belligerent would if determined by the enemy 
generally be strict; if determined by a neutral liberal. 
Both ·would admit that articles solely of use for purposes 
of war should be contraband and usually that articles 
which could not be of use in war should be free. J\1any 
states, particularly in continental Europe, would make 
no further classification than to say all articles which 
may be used in vvar are contraband and others are free. 
These differences shown by various states have usually 
been due to the benefits or injury which might accrue to 
the respective countries. The same state has at different 
times maintained inconsistent positions. Russia in 1884 
declared she would never recognize coal as contraband, 
but it 'vas included in the absolute contraband list in the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5. 
Against this inclusion Great Britain protested vigor-
ously. In 1915 Great Britain and Russia issued identical 
lists of contraband including fuel in conditional con-
traband. 
There seemed to have been growing up during the 
latter half o£ the nineteenth century a considerable sup-
port for the idea of contraband by nature and contraband 
by destination. 
The essential elements of contraband of war were well 
stated by Historicus : 
In order to constitute contraband of war, it is absolutely essen-
tial that two elements should concur-viz. a hostile quality an(l a 
hostile destination. If either of these elements is wanting, there 
can be no such thing as contraband. Innocent goods going to 
a belligerent port are not contraband. Here there is a hostile 
destination, but no hostile quality. Hostile goods, such as muni-
tions of war, going to a neutral port are not contraband. Here-
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there is a hostile quality, but. no hostile destination. (Historicus 
on International Law, p. 191.) 
The United States, Great Britain, and Japan have 
usually divided the articles which might be used in war 
into those solely for such use and those which might be 
used for war purposes or for peace purposes, such as food-
stuffs. The great difficulty was the assignment of cer-
tain articles to the proper category. Chief Justice Chase 
in . the case of the Peter hoff in 1866 stated a simple fact 
when he said : 
The classification of goods. as. contraband or not contraband 
has much perplexed text writers and jurists. A strictly accurate 
and satisfactory classification is: perhaps. impracticable. (5 Wal-
lace, p. 2'8.) 
Mr. Balfour said in 1904: 
I could not give a list of things which are or are not contra-
band of war, nor could any international lawyer fulfill any such 
demand. 
There had been many attempts to determine the list of 
contraband by treaty agreements bet-ween two or more 
states. A treaty bet,veen the United States and Prussia 
of 1799, revised in 1828, ]:Jrovides in Article XIII that: 
All cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bon1bs, grenades, bullets, 
balls, muskets., flints, matches, powder, saltpeter, sulphur, cuirasses., 
p:kes, swords, belts, cartouch boxes, saddles, and bridles, beyond 
the quantity necessary for the use of the ship, or beyond that 
which every man serving on board the vessel or passenger ought 
to have, and in general whatever is comprised under the denomi-
nation of arms and military stores, of what description so ever, 
shall be deemed objects of contraband. (VIII U. S. Stat. p. 162.) 
During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 ther~ were 
many diplomatic controversies in regard to the contra-
band list. In these controversies the United States and 
Great Britain took important parts. Russia was brought 
to admit the principle of conditional contraband as ap-
plying to certain articles." The British ambassador wrote 
to the Russian foreign office on October 9, 1904: 
The principle of conditional contraband has: already been 
recognized by the Russian Go·vernment, and it only remains to 
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extend its, appUcation to coal, cotton, and other articles which 
may be used for peaceful or warlike purposes according to cir-
cumstances. Such a 1neasure would be consistent with the law 
and practice of nations and with the well-established rights of 
neutrals. While maintaining the rights of a belligerent, the rights 
of neutrals would be respected, and the source . of a serious, and 
unpr(}fitable controversy would be removed. (Parliamentary 
Papers, Russia, No. 1 [1905], p. 24.) 
The American position early in the nineteenth century 
regarding coal as conditional contraband only is well 
stated in the note o£ Mr. Choate to Lord Lansdowne o£ 
June 24, 1904 : 
1\::IY LoRD: Referring to our recent intervievvs, in ·which you 
expressed a desire to know th~ views of my Government as to 
the order issued by the Russian Government on the 28th of 
February last, 1naking "every kind of fuel, such as coal, naptha, 
alcohol, and other similar materials, unconditionally contraband," 
I am now able to state them as follows: 
These articles enter / into great consumption in the arts of 
peace, to which they are vitally necessary. They are usually 
treated not as "absolutely contraband of war," like articles that 
are intended primarily for 'military purposes in time of war, 'such 
as ordnance, arms, ammunition, etc., but rather as "conditionally 
contraband"; that is to say, articles that 1nay be used for or 
converted to the purposes of war or peace, according to circum-
stances. They may rather be classed with provisions and food-
stuffs of ordinary innocent use, but ·which may become absolutely 
contraband of war ·when actually and especially destined for 
the military and naval forces of the enemy. * * * The recog-
nition in principle, of the treatment of coal and other fuel and 
raw cotton as absolutely contraband of war might ultimately lead 
to a total inhibition of' the sale by neutrals to the people of 
belligerent states of all articles which could be finally converted 
to military uses. Such an extension of the principle, by treating 
coal and all other fuel and raw cotton as absolutely contraband 
of war, simply because they are shipped by a neutral to a non-
blockaded port of a belligerent, would not appear to be in accord 
with reasonable and lawful rights of a neutral commerce. (1904, 
Foreign Relations, U. S., p. 3,34.) 
International consideration.-Three years later, at the 
Second Hague Conference, the British representative 
proposed the entire· abolition of contraband, but no agree-
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ment could be reached by the 44 States attending, though 
a tentative list of absolute contraband received general 
approval but was not formally adopted. 
It remained for the International Naval Conference 
at London in 1908-9 attended by repres~ntatives of the 
10 naval powers, to agree upon contraband lists which 
were then regarded as generally s~tisfactory. This con-
ference in the Declaration of London, signed February 26, 
1909, fixed upon a list of absolute contraband, a list of 
conditional contraband, and an absolutely free list. 
Article 22 of the Declaration of London, the list approved 
at The Hague in 1907, includes as absolute contraband 11 
categories, all of which are primarily of use for war 
except beasts of burden. Article 24 contains 14 categories 
of conditional contraband, food and fuel being the most 
important. Article 28 contains 17 categories of articles 
not to be declared contraband. , Among the most impor-
tant of these are raw cotton, vvool 3:nd other textiles, rub-
ber,. metallic ores. The Declaration of London was not 
ratified and its provisions as to , contraband were not 
adopted in the World vVar. 
Destination.-When in early days goods 'vere either 
absol.:t~tely contraband or else free, all contraband goods 
bou:rld..i·.direct for a belligerent country were liable to 
capture and other goods were free. The destination was 
l!~~ally easily determined and the l.iability was corre-
spondingly clear. With .the introduction of the condi-
tional contraband list the matter of destination became 
much more important, for these articles, such as food and 
fuel, in 1909 were liable to capture not when bound to 
the belligerent country, bu.t only when bound for the 
1nilitary forces, or for places wh,ich were clearly serving 
to support the military forces. In general, goods what-
ever their nature were exempt from capture if having 
a neutral destination. Goods of noncontraband nature 
were exempt whateve1: .their destination. Goods of the 
nature of conditional contraband were liable to capture 
if destined to a mil,itary port or to military forces, but 
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otherwise exempt. Goods of a warlike nature were liable 
to capture if bound for the enemy's country. 
lV ar and co1n1nerce.-The fundamental principle was 
that the fact of existence of war between states did not 
create a condition of belligerency for outside parties. 
The fact that France and Germany were at war did 
not create a hostile rel~t,ion between Italy and either 
of the belligerents. The relations of Italy remained as 
·before and Italy ·would be on terms of friendship with 
both belligerents. The Italian commerce should be free 
as in .time of peace except for restraints necessary for 
legitimate operations of war. The belligerents should 
be permitted to carry on the hostilities without interfer-
ence except for such restraints as would be necessary 
in order that the legitimate commerce of neutrals might 
be maintained. 
Since the state of war is admitted as legitimate, the 
~xercise of belligerent !'ights is legitimate. The exercise 
of these rights in1plies the right to perform such acts as 
are necessary to reduce the enemy to submissj on, pro-
vided these a.cts do not impair generally accepted neutral 
rights. Here is always the point of conflict. What is 
legitimate for the neutral and 'vhat is legitimate for the 
belligerent~ . 
The risk which the belligerent runs is that the contra-
band may be used against him. The risk which the 
owner of contraband runs is loss through capture. The 
risk which the carrier runs is loss of freight, of delay for 
purpose of bringing in the contraband for adjudication, 
and if vessel and contraband have the same owner the 
risk that both may be condemned. Liability begins only 
vvith knowledge. · 
George V of Hanover in the middle of the nineteenth 
_century seemed to wish to extend the penalty for carry· 
ing contraband and provided by law for a $500 fine or 
six months' imprisonment. This penalty was to be ap-
1802-29-2 
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plied also to the carrying of troops, dispatches, or 
couriers. 
Neutrality and equalization.-! t has often been main-
tained that neutrality implied merely i1npartiality. It 
has also been maintained that it involved equal rights 
and privileges for both belligerents. In a note of June 
29, 1915, from the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs to the United States, ·it was intimated that 
the Government of the United States should take meas-
ures to equalize commercial relations between the United 
States and both belligerent parties. To this the United 
States replied on August 12, 1915: 
The Government of the United States has given careful con-
sideration to the , statement of the Imperial and ~oyal Govern-
ment in regard to the exportation of arms and amn1unition from 
the United States to the countries at war with Austria-Hungary 
and Germany. The Government of the United States notes with 
sa~isfaction the recognition by the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment of the undoubted fact that its attitude with regard to the 
exportation of anns and a1nmunition from the United Sta~es is 
prompted by its intention to "maintain the strictest neutrality 
and to conform to the letter of the provisions of international 
treaties," but is surprised to find the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment implying that the observance of the strict principles of the 
law under the conditions which have developed in the present war 
is insufficient, and asserting that this Government should go 
beyond the long recognized rules governing such traffic by neutrals 
and adopt measures to "maintain an attitude of strict parity with 
respect to both belligerent parties." 
To this assertion of an obligation to change or modify the 
rules of international usage on account of special conditions the 
Government of the United States can not accede. The recogni-
tion of an obligation of this sort, unknown to the international 
practice of the past, ·would impose upon every neutral nation a 
duty to sit in judgn1ent on the progress of a ~ar and to restrict 
its commercial intercourse with a belligerent whose naval suc-
cesses prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy. The con-
tention of the Imperial and Royal Government appears to be that 
the advantages~ gained to a belligerent by its superiority on the 
sea should be equaliz,ed by~ the neutral powers by the establish-
ment of a syste1n of nonintercourse with the victor. . The Imperial 
and Royal Government confines its comments to arms and am-
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n1unition, but if the principle for which it contends is sound, it 
should apply with equal' force to all art:cles of contraband. A 
belligerent controlling the high seas might possess an ample sup-
ply of anus and aininunition, but be in want of food and clothing. 
On the novel principle that equalization is a neutral duty, neutral 
nations would be obligated to place an e1nbargo on such articles 
because one of the belligerents could not obtain then1 through 
commercial intercourse. 
But if this prillciple, so strongly urged by the I1nperial and 
Royal Govenunent, should be admitted to obtain by reason of the 
superiority of a belligerent at sea, ought it not to operate equally 
as to a belligerent superior on land? Applying this theory of 
equalization, a belligerent who lacks the necessary munitions to 
contend successfully on land ought to be pennitted to purchase 
the1n from neutrals, while a belligerent 'vith an abundance of war 
stores or vvith the power to produce them should be debarred 
from such traffic. 
1.\lanifestly the idea of strict neutrality now advanced by the 
Imperial and Royal Government would involve a neutral nation 
in a mass of perplexities which would obscure the whole field of 
international obligation, produce econo1nic confusion, and deprive 
all conunerce and industry of legitin1ate fields of enterprise, al-
ready heavily burdened by the unavoidable restrictions _of war. 
(Spec. Sup. An1er. Jour. Int. Law, vol. 9, July, 1915, p. 166.) 
Liability for contr(J)ba((ld'.-This liability is al·ways 
conditioned by the destination of the goods. Sir William 
Scott, the English judge, in pronouncing in 1799 on a 
cargo of cheese on board the J onge M avrga,rretha bound 
from Amsterda1n to Brest, gives a statement "\vhich is 
almost modern : 
But the most important distinction is whether the articles were 
intended for the ordinary uses of life, or even for mercantile 
ships' use, or whether they were going with a h:ghly probable 
destination to military use? Of the matter of fact on which the 
distinction is to be applied, the nature and quality of the port to 
which the articles were going is not an irrational test. If the 
port is a general commercial port, it shall be understood that 
the articles were going for civil use, although occasionally a 
frigate or other ships of war may be constructed in that port. 
On the contrary, if the great predominant character of a porr. 
be that of a port of naval military equipment, it shall be intended 
that the articles were going for military use, although merchant 
ships resort to the same place; and although it is possible that 
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the articles might have been applied to civil consumption-for it 
being impossible to ascertain the final application of an article 
a.naipitis usus-it is not an injurious rule which deduces both 
ways in the final use from the immediate destination, and the 
presumption of a hostile use founded on its destination to a 
1nilitary port is very much inflamed if at the time when the 
articles were going a considerable armament was notoriously pre-
paring to which a supply of these articles would be eminently 
useful. * * * I think myself warranted to pronounce these 
cheeses to be contraband. (1 C. Rob., , p. 188, 189·.) 
Delivery of goods.-There are in many treaties clauses 
permitting the master o£ a merchant vessel to deliver to 
a belligerent articles o:f contraband and then to proceed. 
One of the earliest o:f these was in 1667 bet-ween Great 
Britain and the United Nether lands. The United States 
n1acle such a treaty ·with Sweden as early as 1783 'vhich 
is still in force. The clause relating to the delivery o£ 
contraband in the Prussian treaty, 1799, 'vas important 
in the 'Vorld ''Tar and involved 1n the negotiations 
·with Germany in· regard to the American vessel, the 
lVill£a1n F>. Frye, ·which 'vas sunk by the German cruiser 
Prinz Eitel [i'T·z~edr~ch on the high seas on January 28, 
1915. This clause is in part as :follo·ws: 
And in the same case of one of the contracting parties being 
engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the diffi-
culties and misunderstandings that usually arise respecting 
merchandise of contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and 
Inilitary stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the 
vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of either party, to the 
ene1nies of the other, shall be deemed contraband so as to induce 
confiscation or condemnation and a loss of property to individuals. 
Nevertheless it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles, 
and to detain them for such length of time as the captors may 
think necessary to prevent the· inconvenience or dmnage that 
Inight ensue frmn their proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable , 
compensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the pro-
prietors, and it shall further be allowed to use in the service of 
the captors, the whole or any part of · the military stores so 
detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to be 
ascertained by the current price· at the place of its destination. 
But in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contra-
band, if the n1aster of the vessel stopped will deliver out the 
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goods supposed to be of contraband nature he shall be admitted to 
do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any 
port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her 
voyage. (8 U. S. Stats. 162, 168; also U. S. Treaties and Con-
ventions, 1776-1909, vol. 2, p. 1729.) 
Doubtful destination.-Destination is not alvvays easy 
to prove, but in case of reasonabTe doubt the belligerent is 
justified in bringing in a vessel supposed to be engaged in 
carriage of contraband. This doubt may be due to ir-
regularity of the vessel's papers or to other reasons. The 
commander of the belligerent ship can not act in a judi-
cial capacity and in case of doubt should send a vessel 
to the prize court. 
As conditional contraband was liable to capture only 
when bound for the military forces or use, it is not 
always easy to determine the course of action to be taken 
by a belligerent commander. The Declaration of London 
of 1909 endeavored to render such destination more clear 
and provided in article 34 that : 
There is presumption of the destination referred to in Article 
33 if the consignment is addressed to enemy authorities, or to 
a merchant, established in the ene1ny country, and when it is 
well known that this merchant supplies articles and n1aterial 
of this kind to the ene1ny. The presumption is the san1e if the 
ccnsignment is destined to a fortified place of the enemy, or to 
another place serving as a base for the annecl forces of the enemy ; 
this presun1ption, however, does not apply to the 1nerchant vessel 
herself bound for one of these places and of which vessel it is 
sought to show the contraband character. (1909, N. W. C. Int. 
Law, Topics, p. 83.) 
According to article 35 the ship's papers were to be 
"conclusive proof of the voyage of the vessel as also 
of the port of discharge of the goods." Great Britain, 
France, and Russia in 1914 greatly extended the liability 
by pronouncing liable .to capture goods of the nature of 
conditional contraband bound for a neutral port if con-
signed "to order," to a consignee in enemy's territory, 
or if it is not clear to whom the consign1nent is made. 
The burden of proof of innocent character of the cargo 
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is placed upon the owners of such goods, and if an 
enemy is dra·wing supplies for its forces from a neutral 
country even 1nore stringent rules may be applied. 
Contraband lists.-It ·was thought in 1909 that a list of 
contraband and regulations for its capture which ·would 
be satisfactory for many years had been drawn, but in 
1914 the greater 1naritime po·wers sho\ved a disposition to 
depart fron1 its provisions and arbitrarily to establish 
lists which should be for their presumed and temporary 
advantage. Clearly it ·would have been better for the 
·world and probably for the belligerents themselves to 
abide by some general agree1nent which had been dra·wn 
by representatives of the great mariti1ne powers in a 
time of peace. Controversies raged in regard to the 
treat1nent of cotton, food, and other articles. Neutral 
states ·were irritated by restraints on trade. It is evident 
that an equable adjustment. of belligerent and neutral 
rights ·would have been far better ev~n in time of hostili-
ties and that to 1naintain the principles of justice is 
not merely expedient but an evidence of farseeing 
statesmanship. 
British and continenta:l vietos.-The British Royal 
Con1mission of Supply of Food and Raw Material in 
Time of War in 1905 says in regard to the- difference 
between the British and continental points of vie\Y In 
regard to contraband that: 
All discussions as to the nature of the goods which 1nay be 
treated as contraband start with the threefold distinction bebYeen 
things which are useful only in war, things which are useless for 
war, and things which are useful both in 'var and in peace. As 
to articles of the first class, there is practically no difference of 
opinion. Cannon, bayonets, uniforn1s and ammunition. for in-
stance. are ad1nitted on all hands to be contraband of war; the 
sole question being whether only finished articles are of this 
character. or whether the character is shared also by their com-
ponent parts. and by machinery for putting the1n together. Ar-
ticles of the second class, e·. g., a piano or a portrait by Gains-
borough, are as obviously~'' innocent." It is as to the third class 
of articl~s, res a.n.c"-ipit.vs nsu,s, that controversies have arisen; 
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and here two opposing schools of opinion have to be reckoned 
with. According to what may be called the " Continental school," 
the tern1 "contraband " covers only articles the use of which is 
exclusively warlike; while according to what 1nay be called the 
"British school," which is also that of the United States, the 
list of contraband is. an elastic one, comprising not only such 
"absolutely " contraband articles as would be included in the 
first category Inentioned above, but also articles which are 
" conditionally" or " relatively " contraband with reference to the 
special character of the war. It would appear, however, that the 
oprwsition b2t\veen the Continental and British views is not un-
likely to end in a reasonable comprmnise. Already Continental 
lists tend to include the materials out of which, and the machin-
ery by means of which, arn1s. and ammunition are Inanufactured; 
while the "conditional " contraband of the British school is 
admittedly restricted to articles indicated as noxious by special 
circtunstances, and it is subjected only to the mitigated penalty of 
p1·e-8xemption instead of to confiscation. (Vol. I, p. 23, sec. 96.) 
Ratio.-With reference to the ratio of contraband in 
a vessel's cargo, the question is usually as to its effect 
upon the liability of the vessel. There have been differ-
ing doctrines as to the proportion of contraband that 
vvould make the vessel liable to confiscation. The Decla-
ration of London reached an -agreement ·which seemed 
generally acceptable, in 1909. 
AR'riCLE 40 
The confiscation of the vessel carrying contraband is allowed 
if tlle contraband forms, either by v·alue, by weight, by volttme or 
by freight, 1nore than half the cargo. 
It was universally admitted, however, that in eerta:n cases 
the conde1nnation of the contraband does not suffice, and that con· 
demnation should extend to the vessel herself, but opinions dif-
fered as to the detennination of these cases. It was decided to 
fix upon a certain proportion between the contraband and the 
total cargo. 
But the question divides itself: (1) "\Vhat shall be the 
proportion? The solution adopted is the n1ean between those 
proposed, which ranged frmn a quarter to three quarters. (2) 
How shall this proportion be reckoned? :Must the contraband 
form 1nore than half the cargo in voluine, weight, value, or 
freight? The adoption of a single fixed standard gives rise to 
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theoretical objections, and also encourages practices intended to 
a void concle1nnation of the vessel in spite of the ilnportance of 
the cargo. If the standard of volume or weight is adopted, . the 
master will ship innocent goods sufficien'Uy bulky, or w·eighty 
in order that the volun1e or weight of the contraband 1nay be 
less. A silnilar remark may be made as regards the value or 
the freight. The consequence is that it suffices, in order to justify 
condemnation, that the contraband shoulcl fonn 1nore than half 
the cargo according to any one of the points of' view 1nentioned. 
This 1nay sce1n severe; but, on tne one hand, proceeding in any 
other 1nanner would make fraudulent calculations easy, and, on 
the other, it may be said that the condemnation of the vessel is 
justified when the carriage of contraband forn1ecl an in1portant 
part of her venture, \vhich is true in each of the· cases. specified. 
(General Report, 1909, Naval 'Var College, p. 89.) 
This point o-f vie·w vvas upheld by belligerents gen-
erally in the World War as equable. It vvas affirmed that 
ignorance could not be rationally affirn1ed if more than 
half the cargo vvas contraband. 
In the case of the H aika({LJ, there vvas raised in the 
British prize court several questions. These vvere: 
First·, apart from any Resolutions or Articles. of the London 
Conference, what was the· ruJe of the law of nations affecting a 
vessel which in the circumstances of this case was carrying a 
cargo consisting wholly of contraband destined for the· enemy? 
Secondly, was the Order in Council adopting Art. 40 of the 
Declaration of London so contrary to such a rule that the Order 
was invalid; or was. it sufficiently consistent with such a rule, 
or did it so Initigate the rule in favour of the enemy, that it 
acquired validity, in accordance with the· doctrine stated by 
the Privy Council in the Za1nora? Or, thirdly, did the acts of 
the representatives of the various Powers at the Conference, and 
the subsequent action and practice of their States, bring into 
existence, by a sufficiently general consensus of view and assent, 
a new or modified rule of the law of nations upon the subject, to 
which effect ought to be given in their Prize Courts. at the 
pre~ent day, apart from any Order in Council? 
As to the first, havjng regard to the decrees and practices of 
the nations for the last 100 years., I should feel bound to de·clare 
that the rule which prevailed before the relaxation introduced a 
century or more ago shquld be regarded as valid at the present 
day. 'l'his means that the so-called well-established rule in 
favour of a contraband-laden ship contended for by the claimants 
does not exist. In the days of the relaxation referred to, the ship 
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"as subject to confiscation in many respects, which were smne-
time·s called exceptions. It has always been held that if any 
part of the contraband carried belonged to the owner O'f the 
ship, the ship itself was subject to the penalty of confiscation, 
as was the · contraband. According to our most recent writers, 
the vessel suffered if her owner \Vas privy to the carriage o.f the 
contraband goods, whether they belonged to him or not (see 
'Vestlake, p. 291; I-Iall, p. 666). In the present day, even more 
than in the past, the owner must be taken to know either 
directly or thi·ough the master how this vessel is laden, or to 
what use she is put. * * * 
Secondly, it follows, frmn what I have stated, that the pro-
visions of Art. 40 were a lin1itation or m tig=ttion of some of the 
rights of the Crown; and the result of the decision in the Zanwr a 
is that accordingly the provisions in the Order in Council are 
valid. 
Thirdly, although there is no formal instrument binding as an 
international convention, I think that the attitude and action 
of the most important m:lritilne States before and since 1908 
have been such as to justify the Court in accepting as: forming 
part of the law of nations at the present day a rule that neutral 
vessels carrying contraband which by value, we ght, volu1ne or 
freight value, forms more than half the cargo, are subject to 
confiscation, and to condemnat:on as good and lawful prizes of 
war. ( [1916] P. 226.) 
On appeal to the judicial committee o£ the pr1vy 
council, it 'vas said in 1917: 
Their Lordships consider that in this state of the authorities 
they ought to hold that knowledge of the character of the goods 
on the part of the owner of the ship is sufficient to justify the 
condemnation of the ship, at any r=tte where the goods il~ question 
constitute a substantial part of the whole cargo. ( [1918] A. C. 
148.) 
Departm.ent of State, 1.915.-Ea.rly in 1915 Senator 
Stone, o£ the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
sun1marized co1nplaints and charges 'vhich had come to 
him on the observance o£ neutrality by the United States. 
These he submitted to · the Secretary o£ State under 20 
heads. The replies to so1ne o£ these shov-v the attitude of 
the Department o£ State at the time: 
( 4) S,ubmission w·ithout protest to Bri.tish v·iolation.s of the 
rules re.cJardln,q absolu.te and conditional contraban.d as laid. doton 
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in The Ha,gue conventions, the DBclarafi.on of London, and inter-
nati.ona-l law. 
· There is no Hague convention which deals with absolute or 
conditional contraband, and, as the declaration of London is 
not in force, the rules of international law only apply. As to 
the articles to be regarded as contraband, there is no general 
agreement between nations. It is the practice for a country, 
either in time of peace or after the outbreak of war, to declare 
the articles which it will consider . as abs?lute or conditional con-
traband. It is true tha.'t a neutral Government is seriously affected ·, 
by this declaration as the rights· of its subjects or citizens may 
be impaired. But the rights and interests of belligerents and 
neutrals are opposed in respect to contrahand articles and tr3-de 
and there is no tribunal to which quest:ons of difference may 
be readily submitted. 
The record of the United States in the past is not free from 
criticism. When neutral this Government has stood for a re-
stricted list of absolute and conditional contraband. As a bellig-
erent, we have contended for a liberal list, according to our con-
ception of the necessities of the case. 
The UnLed States has. made earnest representations to Great 
Britain in regard to the seizure and detention by the British 
authorities of all American ships or cargoes bona fide destined 
to neutral ports, on the ground that such seizures and detentions 
were contrary to the existing rules of international law. It will 
be recalled, however, that American courts have established 
various rules bearing on these matters. The rule of " continuous 
voyage" has been not only asserted by American tribunals but 
extended by ·· them. They have exercised -the right to determine 
from, . . the circumstanc~s '~hetl:ter . the O$tensible - was the real 
destination. They have held that the shipment of articles of 
contraband to a neutral port " to order," from which, as a matter 
of fact, cargoes had been transshipped to the enemy, is corrobo-
rative evidence ~hat the cargo is really destined to the enemy 
instead of to the neutral port of delivery. It is thus seen that 
some of the doctrines which appear to bear harshly upon neutrals 
at the present time are analogous to or ou:growths from policies 
adopted by the United States when it was a belligerent. The 
Government therefore can not consistently protest against the 
application of rules which it has followed in the past, unless 
they have not been practiced as heretofore. 
( 5) Acquiescence W'ithout protest to the inclusi-on of copper and 
other articles in the British lists of absolute contra;band. 
The United States: has now under consideration the question 
of the right of a belligeren~ to indude "copper unwrought" in 
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its list of absolute contraband instead of in its list of conditional 
contraband. As the Government of the United States has in the 
past placed " all ar~icles frmn which ammunition is manufac-
tured" in its contraband list, and has declared copper to be a1nong 
such 1naterials, it necessa1;ily finds smne embarrassment in deal-
ing with the subject. 
lVIoreover, there is no instance of the United States acquiescing 
in Great Bri.ain's seizure of copper shipments. In every case, 
in which it has been done, vigoi'ous repr~sentations have· been 
made to the British Govern1nent, and the representatives of the 
United States have pressed for the release of the shipments. 
( 6) Sub1nission without protest to interference with American 
trade to neutral countri'es in conditional and absolute contraband. 
The fact that the com1nerce of the United States is interrupted 
by Great BrLain is consequent upon the superiority of her navy 
on the high seas. History shows that whenever a country has 
possessed that superiority our trade has been interrupted and 
that few articles essential to the prosecution of the war have 
been allowed to reach its enemy from this country. The depart-
ment's recent note to the British Govern1nent, which has been 
made public, in regard 1o detentions and seizures of American 
vessels and cargoes, is a cmnplete answer to this complaint. 
* * * * * * 
( 8) Subn'Vi,ssion to British interference u;,ith trade in petroleum, 
1·ubber, leather, wool, etc. 
Petrol and other petroleum products have been proclaimed by 
Great Britain as contraband of war. In view of ~he absolute 
necessity of such products to the use of submarines, aeroplanes, 
and motors, the United States Govern1nent has not yet .reached 
the conclusion that they are improper!~ included in ' a lis:: of 
contraband. Military operations to-day are largely a question of 
motive power through mechanical devices. It i.s therefore diffi-
cult to argue successfully against the inclusion of petroleum 
among the .articles of contraband. As to the detention of cargoes 
of petroleum going to neutraJ countries, thi~ Governn1ent has, thus 
far successfully, obtained the release in every case of detention 
or seizure which has been brought to its attention. 
Great Britain and France have placed 111bber on the absolute 
contraband list and leather on the conditional contraband li'st. 
Rubber is extensively used in the 1nanufacture aud operation of 
rnotors and, like· petrol, is regarded by son1e authorities as essen-
tial to motive power to-day. Leather is even more widely used 
in cavalry and infantry equipment. It is understood that both 
rubber and leather, together with wool, have ' been e1nbarg9ed by 
most of the belligerent countries. It will be recalled that the 
.. 
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United States has in the past exercised the right of embargo 
upon exports of any commodity which might aid the· enemy's 
cause. (Senate Doc. No. 716, 63d Cong., 2d sess.) 
Pa.rlianventarry discussioni of contraband, 1916.-The 
British Government in 1916 \vas much concerned \vith de-
terinining \vhat should be classed as contraband and there 
were differences o£ opinion. Mr. Leverton Harris, who 
had been directly associated with the administration, said 
in January, 1916: 
I do not think it ought to be assu1ned that e-verything which 
reaches Germany or Austria benefits those countries or assists 
them to win the \Var. That vvas rather the· line·, I think, taken 
by the right hon. Gentleman opposite1 (Sir II. Dalziel). I know 
there are· many peop·le· in this country who would like to see· every 
conceivable commodity stopped frmn reaching our enen1ies. Per-
sonally I do not agre·e with then1. On the contrary, I think 
there are many goods which have· reached, and may to-day, be 
reaching Germany and Austria which are· doing those countries a 
considerable a1nount of harm, and giving their Gove-rnme·nts a 
great deal of anxiety. It would lJe very instructive· and inte-r-
e~ting if some· expe-rt could prepare· a list of articles which are 
being imported, or are in the habit of be.fng ilnported, into enemy 
countrie·s, and classify the·m according to their military or eco--
noinic value. Such a list would obviously start vvith such things 
as shells and other munitions; next you would find the· raw ma-
terials or senii-manufactured articles which have a ce·rtain military 
value; then you might place· food supplies, beginning possibly 
with such articles as¥ lard, oil, and other fatty substances which 
are so much needed in Germany at the present 1noment; then 
you would come to articles. which are· used for the purposes of 
manufacture or co1nmerce·; and lastly, you would come to articles 
of pure luxury, the· list ending perhaps with something like 
dia1nond necklaces or ve1;y expensive· pictures. Eve·rybody is 
agreed that it is essential to do everything we· can to stop from 
going to Ger1nany or Austria those· articles which will appear at 
the top of the list-that is to say, articles of any military value 
or of any value as an ecc-nomie food for the· population in enemy 
countries. On the· other hand, the· importation into Germany or 
Austria of such articles: as appear at the· bottmn of the· list does 
not prolong the '\Var for one· minute·; in fact, I suggest that such 
in1portation does material harm to our ene·mies and may shorten 
the \Var. Articles of luxury, such as jewe1s, and so on, have to 
be paid for like everything else, and they have to be· paid for either 
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by exchange operations or: else in gold or by the export of se-
curities, with the result that we see at the present thne-the very 
great depreciation in the value of the 1nark. The difficulty one 
has to face is in regard to the classes of articles that fall in the 
centre of the list, such articles, for instance, as tea or cocoa. I 
have changed my mind n1ore than once about tea. Tea, I think, 
does not possess any very great military value, although I under-
stand it is an alternative ration. It is certainly found that 
whilst we in this country are trying to keep certain classes of 
these goods away fr01n Germany, the German Government also is 
endeavoring to check the1r sale. The German Government is 
doing all it can to prevent certain classes of articles, which are 
more or less luxuries or not necessities, fron1 con1ing in fron1 
abroad and having to be paid for by the export of gold or secur-
ities. (Parliamentary Debates, Cmnmons [19'16], LXXVIII, p. 
1309.) 
This I will say in conclusion: The vital thing is to succeed in 
stopping German conunerce. I believe we have a perfect right 
to do that· by every principle of international la\v. I believe 
it is perfectly legitimate for a belligerent to cut off all c01nmerce 
from his enemy and to destroy and injure it by econmnic pressure 
exerted to the fullest extent quite as much as by any 1nilitary 
operation. I am sure it is not only a legitimate and effective 
but that" it is also a humane method. I a1n quite sure that since 
this country has the power to exercise· it this country ought 
to do so to the full. With that I think we ought to combine 
absolute respect for the rights of other nations. vVe ought to set 
an example of law-abiding and just treabnent eYen of the s1naller 
natious, and I believe myself that that policy, which I am con-
vinced is right and in accordance with the best principles of 
British conduct in the past, is also the wisest and effective policy 
if we desire to carry out the main object of all these operations, 
namely, the destruction of the power of the enemy. (Ibid. p. 
1816.) 
British statement, 1916.-Lord Robert Cecil, Under-
secretary of State £or Foreign Affairs, replying to a 
question in the House of Commons, March 9, 1916, said: 
I have constantly told the House that, in my vie·w, the 
Declaration of London is an instrument which has no binding 
force whatever. The position with regard to this country is 
that certain parts, only certain parts, were selected at the out-
break of the War by the Government of the day as embodying 
what they believed· to be the principle of international law 
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applicable to belligerent conditions, and believing that to be the 
case they" hav-e , ag~,eeq, aqd they .thil~k ,it a co.nvenient form, to 
refer to the Declaration of London as embodying it. But the 
Government never intended-at any rate, this Government does 
not intend-to be bound by the Declaration of London, apart 
from and so far as it differs from the principle of international 
law which prevailed at the outbreak of the vVar. I very much 
doubt, and it is very much doubted by lawyers, whether the 
issue of an Order in Council that the Government intend to adopt 
the Declaration of' London would bind the Prize Court, and it 
is a matter of great doubt, in point of fact, if that Declaration 
contained principles and doctrines which were· not in accordance 
with the principles of international law. But I can not make it 
too clear whether that is so or not, the policy of the Government 
is to abide by the principles of international law whether they are 
in favour of or against us, and to adhere to the·m, and them only, 
and it is only so far as the Declaration of London embodies those 
principles that they have any intention of be-ing bound by its 
provisions. (Parliamentary De pates, Commons [1916], 80 H. C. 
Deb. 5 s., p. 1813.) * * * 
If they are changes in principles, they ought not to be made, 
but if they are merely applying the principles to new conditions, 
that is not a change. All English lawyers are profoundly familiar 
with that. It is just as the ordinary growth of case law. You 
have your principle of law which is applied to the particular cir-
cumstances of each case, and the· rulings thereupon being made 
make new definitions of the principle of law, which none the less 
always existed before those decisions. That is what I intended to 
convey, and that is, I think, the only sound vie·w. (Ibid. ,P· 
1814.) * * * 
I am not quite sure what is meant by this phrase of a "real 
blockade." I do know that such legal opinion as I have been 
able to consult agrees with my own impression that to make any 
Declaration of Blockade, as we should have to do under the 
ordinary rules of international law, defining the limits and show-
ing . where the line of blockade was to be, if we attempted to . do 
anything of that kind I think we· should find ourselves in much 
greater legal difficulties than we find ourselves in at the present 
time. I do not see that we should get anything whatever by doing 
so. My hon. and gallant Friend said, "Why not apply the doc-
trine of continuous voyage?" We have applied it and worked 
it, and it is the very foundation of the whole of the action which 
we have taken. You can not blockade' an enemy through a 
neutral country except by the operation of that doctrine. Our 
plan is to arrest all commerce of Germany, whether going in or 
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·• coming ·out, whether -it.-con1es through a neutral port or a German 
port; that is the whole object and the whole difficulty of our 
position. We have to discover for certain what is German and 
what is neutral commerce. I can not understand what more you 
can do by blockade. (Ibid. p. 1815.) * * * 
British contraband list, 1916.-0n April 13, 1916, the 
British foreign office issued a list of articles declared 
contraband of war, saying: 
The list comprises the articles which have been declared to be 
absolute contraband as well as those which have been declared 
to be conditional contraband. The circumstances of the present 
war are so peculiar that His :Majesty's Government consider that 
for practical purposes the distinction between the two classes of 
contraband has ceased to have any value. So large a proportion 
of the inhabitants of the enemy country are taking part, directly 
or indirectly, in the war that no real ·distinction can now be 
drawn between the armed forces and the civilian population. 
Similarly, the enemy Government has taken control, by a series of 
decrees and orders, of practically all the articles in the list of 
conditional contraband, so that they are now available for Gov-
ernment use. So long as these exceptional conditions continue 
our belligerent rights with respect to the two kinds of contraband 
are the same, and our treatment of them must be identical. (Par. 
Papers, Misc. No. 12 [1916].) 
This list enumerated about 170 articles arranged alpha-
betically from " acetic acid and acetates " to " zinc." 
Lists of contraband and oatogovries.-The attempt to 
make lists of articles which may be declared contraband 
of war has in earlier wars, as in the World War, led to 
many controversies. Grotius, in 1625, however, enu-
merated the categories within which articles absolutely 
contraband, conditional contraband, and free articles 
might fall, though, as previously stated, not using the 
term "contraband." The practice of publishing lists of 
~ 
contraband has made it necessary to make frequent addi-
tions and changes in the list, which make the administra-
tion of the laws in regard to contraband difficult for the 
belligerent and the observance difficult for the neutral. 
While the Instructions for the Navy of the United 
States Governing Maritime Warfare of June, 1917, 
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referred to a contraband list, it 'vas a classification by 
categories, leaving a reasonable freedom for both bellig-
erent and neutral. Article 24 of these rules is as follo-ws : 
The articles and materials mentioned in the following para-
graphs (a.), (b), (c), and (d), actually destined to territory 
belonging to or occupied by the enemy or to armed forces of 
tbe enemy, and the articles and materials mentioned in ~he 
following paragraph (e) actually destined for the use of the 
enemy Government or its _armed forces, are, unless exempted 
by tre·aty, regarded as contraband. 
(a) All kinds of arms, guns, ammunition, explosives, and 
machines for their manufacture or repair; component parts 
thereof; materials or ingredients. used in their manufacture; 
articles necessary or convenient for their use. 
(b) All contrivances for or means of transportation on land, 
in the water or air, and machines used in their manufacture or 
repair; component parts thereof; materials or ingredients used 
in their manufacture; instruments, articles or animals necessary 
or convenient for their use. 
(c) All means of communicati~n, tools, implements, instru-
ments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers and other articles, ma-
ch:nes, or documents, necessary or convenient for carrying on 
hostile operations. 
(d) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt ; also metal, 
materials, dies, plates, machinery or other articles necessary or 
convenient for their manufacture. 
(e) All kinds of fuel, food, foodstuffs, feed, forage, and clothing 
and articles and materials used in their manufacture. 
In a list of articles of contraband of war it is cus-
tomary to name clothing of military character. In 
modern \Varfare the important supply for a belligerent 
may Be clothing of all kinds, as the supply of one kind 
of clothing may make it possible by substitution to sup-
ply another to the arn1ed forces because almost any kind 
of clothing may be used for certain services ·where the 
combatants are not brought into immediate contact. 
British decisions in W ovrld W ar.-The doctrine of con-
tinuous voyage received attention from time to time in 
the British CQUrts during the World War. The con-
ditions of commerce were such as to make transportation 
through neutral countries common.. An elaborate state-
rnent on the subject was n1ade by Sir Samuel Evans in the 
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case of the Ki1n, the Aufred Nobel, the Bjornsterjne 
Bjornson, and the Fridland, decided in Septe1nber, 1915. 
He said: 
I have no hesitation in pronouncing that, in 1ny view, the 
doctrine of continuous voyage, or transportation, both in rela-
tion to carriage by sea and to carriage over land, had become 
part of the law of nations at the commencement of the present 
war, in accordance with the principles of recognized legal deci-
sions, and with the view of the great body of modern jurists, 
and also with the practice of nations in recent maritime warfare. 
The result is that the court is not restricted in its vision to 
the primary consignn1ents of the goods in these cases to the 
neutral port of Copenhagen; but is entitled, and bound, to take 
a more extended outlook in order to ascertain whether this 
neutral destination was n1erely ostensible and, if so, what the 
real ultimate destination 'vas. 
As to the real destination of a cargo, one of the chief tests is 
whether it was consigned to the neutral port to be there delivered 
for the purpose of being in1ported into the co1n1non stock of the 
country. * * * 
The argument still remains good, that if shippers, after the 
outbreak of the war, consign goods of the nature of contraband to 
their own order without naming a consignee, it may be a circuin-
stance of suspicion in considering the question whether the goods 
were really intended for the neutral destination, and to become 
part of the common stock of the neutral country, or whether they 
had another ulthnate destination. Of course, it is not conclusive. 
The suspicion arising from this. form of consignment during war 
might be dispelled by evidence produced by the shippers. It may 
be here observed that son1e point was 1nade that in 1nany of the 
consignments the bills of lading were not made out "to order'' 
simpliciter, but to bran~hes or agents of the shippers. ~rhat 
circumstance does not, in my opinion, make any material differ-
ence. (The Kint [1915], p. 215; see also 1922 Naval War College, 
p. 50, 96-98.) 
In the case of B own.a in 1918, the question was as to 
the condemnation of 416 tons of coconut oil shipped on 
a Norwegian steamship and seized in a Bristol port. The 
Crown contended that it rested on the claimants who 
were neutraT-
to establish that the destination of the oil was neutral ; and, 
further, that the oil was subject to condemnation on the ground 
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either (1) that it, and the 1nargarine for the n1anufacture of 
which it was acquired, should, in the circumstances, be deemed 
to have an enemy destination; or (2) that such margarine, when 
manufactured, would to the knowledge of the claimants be con-
sumed in Sweden in substitution for Swedish butter to be 
supplied to Germany. (The B,__~nna [1918], p. 123; see also 1922 
Naval vVar College, p. 172.) * * * 
Statistics were given in evid~nce to show the increase of the 
importation into Sweden of raw materials for margarine and of 
the production and sale of margarine, and to show the s:mul-
taneous increase of the export of butter from Sweden to Germany. 
They were interesting, and- beyond doubt they proved that the 
more margarine was made for the Swedes the more butter was 
supplied by them to the Germans; and that when by reason of the 
naval activity of this country the imports for margarine produc-
tion became diminished, the Swedish butter was kept for con-
sumption within Sweden itself and ceased to be sent to the 
enemy. (Ibid. p. 175.) 
Oonsignments.-In early ti1nes the place to which 
goods of the nature of contraband were .to go ·was much 
more a matter of vital concern to a belligerent than the 
person of the consignee. Gradually the person to whom 
the goods are consigned has become a more in1 portant 
factor in determ.ining the ultima.te destination of such 
goods. During the World War, when th~ means· of 
transportation were so highly developed, there arose 
many questions in regard to consignments. 
In 1921, on appeal, a case was brought before the 
judicial committee of the privy council and Lord Parmoor 
stated: 
The appellants are an import and export company claiming 
on behalf of Enrique Rubio, who was the shipper and consignor 
of certain boxes of Valencia oranges seized on the Norwegian 
steamships Nome, Grove, and Haraanger, during December, 1915, 
while on voyages from Valencia, in Spain, to Rotterdam, in 
Holland. The amount involved is not considerable, but it was 
stated that the case had been selected as a test case which would 
govern a number of other cases. * * * 
The consignee named in the bill of lading covering the oranges 
shipped on the Norne was A. J. de Graaf, and the consignee 
named in the other h':o bills of lading, covering the oranges 
shipped on the Grove and H ardanger, 'vas Van Hoeckel. * * * 
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The contention of the appellants is that the destination of· 
the voyage was Rotterdmn, and that if the voyage had been 
carried through without interruption the oranges would in the 
ordinary course of business have been offered to local dealers-
at public auction, thereby becoming part of the common stock 
of a neutral country, to whatever consumers they might ultimately 
be sold. It was said that if thi~ contention is not accepted, and 
it is held that the anticipation that a large proportion of the· 
oranges n1ay go for consu1nption in Germany is sufficient to 
make them contraband, the consequence is that goods within 
the category of conditional contraband would be liable to seizure 
and condemnation wherever there was antic~pation that they might 
be largely sold to enemy customers. * * * 
Their Lordships are unable to hold that the mere fact that 
goods will be offered for sale by auction at the port of arrival 
is in itself conclusive of the innocency of their destination. It 
would appear to them to be too wide a generalization that 
whatever • the special condition's may be, · the goods could never 
be· condemned as contraband, if once it is established that they 
would be offered at public auction in a neutral market. (1921 
A. C. 765.) 
On other grounds it was decided that at the time of 
seizure there was a substantial interest in the consign-
ment held by a Ger1nan firm and the judgment of the 
prize court that the oranges were la w:ful prize was. 
affirmed. 
Position of Admiral Rodgers.-Writing in 1923, Ad--
mir'al ,V. L. Rodgers, United States Navy, ·took the· 
point o£ view that modern trade systems call :for change&. 
in international law. 
Blockade and contraband both operate against the organized"! 
belligerent effort of the hostile government. But new develop-· 
ments of international trade and transportation are rendering 
it possible that adherence to the old rules makes it increasingly 
difficult for a belligerent to disorganize and disrupt the national\ 
life of the enemy, yet this is a legitimate and humane method. 
of practicing war. 
The basis of principle of the chief rules now current were· 
established before commerce and transportation assu1ned their 
present great scale through the agency of steam power. The· 
size of nations, their power and their complexity have become· 
so great that the old I:ules of contraband and blockade need great: 
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modification. Present-day practice, ho'\vever, by certain great 
powers., is. in accord with present world -conditions, no matter 
how loud conservative outcry may be against current practice. 
Qreat Britain's position of tnaritilne preponderance for over a 
century has given her a singularly clear insight into the workings 
of i.nternational law. As we now wish to rival Great Britain in 
our merchant trade, we can not fail to find our national advantage 
in accepting the views of international law which she has so 
consistently tnain tained. 
·The position of the United StatEs administration of the day, 
representing the nation, has. varied according to requirements 
and interest of the nation, (or of special class interests), as it 
was either be1ligerent or neutral. Other nations vary in the 
same way. • 
In t"me of our neutrality we have stood for neutral rights 
of trade and frcedo1n of the seas. In tilne of' our belligerency 
we have stood for the rigor of the gatne, extension of contra-
band lists, continuous voyage, etc. In the Civil War our stand 
on continuous voyage was a forward step for belligerent privi-
lege. Our views of immunity for private property during that 
war were different from those we urged before and after that 
period when other peoples were at war. and the United States was 
neutral. · (17 Atner. Jour. Int. Law [Jan. 1923], p. 7.) 
Opinion of Sir Erle Richarrds.-· The late Sir Erie 
Richards, vvho often during the \Vorld "'\Var maintained 
before British courts the rights of neutrals, said : 
The particular items which can properly be included in lists of 
contraband must depend to some extent on the particular cir-
cumstances of each war, but it seems certain that belligerents 
must have the right to determine those lists in the first instance. 
An attempt to enforce fixed lists of contraband, irrespective of 
any future advance in chemistry, was made at the London Con-
ference; but the agreetnent there arrived at was found to be 
wholly impracticable, al}d was abandoned by e:very one of the 
belligerent Powers. The scheme of the Declaration of London 
was to have three Hsts: the first of articles which might be 
treated as absolute contraband, the second of articles which 
might be treated as conditional contraband, the. third of articles 
1-vhich could never be declared contraband at all. But these lists 
pi·oved to be wholly inappropl'iate, and the war had not long 
been in progress before it was found that some articles in the 
third or free list were essential to the manufacture of munitions: 
raw cotton, rubber and metallic ores, for instance, were found td 
be of such importance in tnunition tnaking that they were declared 
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. to be absolute contraband, although in 1909 it had been agreed 
that they should never be declared contraband at all. The Allies 
refused to be bound by the Declaration in this respect- from the 
very first, and the Central Powers soon followed suit. This 
experience te-aches us that it is impossible to have lists fixed in 
neutral. · (17 An1er. Jour. Int. Law [Jan. -1923], p. 7.) 
1.1! oore on doctrine of contraband.-J udge M;oore in 
1923, referring to the practice and argun1ents made dur-
ing and subsequent to the World 'V ar in regard to abso-
lute and conditional· contraband, said: 
During the recent wa1:· there were exigent belligerent 1neasures 
which in effe·ct n1erged the second category in the first. 'l'h~se 
1neasures were defended on the ground that the " circ'Q.mstances" 
of the war were "so peculiar" that "for all practical purposes 
the distinction between . the two elasses of contraband " .had 
"ceased to have value"; that "so large a proportion of the in-
habitants of the enemy · country" were ''taking part in the war, 
directly or indirectly,_ that no real distinction" could be drawn 
"between the arn1ed forces and the civilian population"; . that 
"sin1ilarly" the ene1ny governn1ent had "taken control, by a 
series of decrees and orders, of practically all the articles in the 
list of conditional contraband, so that they are now available for 
government use"; and that "so long as these except~onal con-
ditions" continued, " belligerent rights in regard to the two kinds 
of contraband" were the same and the "treatment of them must 
be identical." 
Probably under the influence of these arguments, and without 
full appreciation of the implication, which they seem to have 
been anxiously designed to convey, that the measures were to be 
regarded as highly emergent and altogether exceptional, it has 
lately been intimated that the distinction, defended and main-
tained through ::eons of almost forgotten time, between articles 
absolutely and articles conditionally contraband, has been shown 
by the recent war to be unsound and should no longer be pre-
served. One writer has indeed gone so far as to assert that 
the distinction "dates from the time when armies we·re very 
small, and comprised only a very small fraction of the belligerent 
countries," a statement that would have astonished Grotius, 
and that n1ust equally astonish those who are familiar with 
the history, either legal or military, of the wars growing o-ht 
of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic vVars. For rea-
sol!s such as these it has been suggested, but not, I believe, by 
any government, that the category of "conditional contraband" 
should now be evacuated and decently interred, and its contents 
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in~lu~~d in the absolute list. The suggestion is startling, since 
its acceptance would at once render illicit practically all trade 
with countries at war, and put in jeopardy much of the trade 
.even between countries not at war. 
But we must not permit ourselves to be betrayed by illusions 
of novelty. We do our ancestors grave injustice if we think 
they admitted that a belligerent might capture at sea and con-
fiscate all commodities destined to his enemy which perchance 
might be used for a military purpose, but believed that bellig-
erent governments then could not or did not appropriate within 
their own jurisdiction whatever they needed for war. Our 
ancestors were not so hopelessly senseless. They were, on the 
contrary, consciously engaged in a conflict, which has not ceased, 
between belligerent claims to stop trade and neutral claims to 
carry it on. Neutrals denied the right of belligerents to capture 
and confiscate anything but articles primarily useful for war. 
So far as concerned foodstuffs, the defenders of neutral rights, 
while fully aware that armies must and did eat, maintained 
that the noncombatant mouths always vastly outnumbered the 
combatant, so· that the preponderant consumption of food was 
ordinarily not hostile. They carried their point, with the single 
concession, the narrowness of which was ~utually and perfectly 
understood, that foodstuffs should becml}e contraband if, when 
seized, they were destined for distinctively military use. (Moore, 
International Law and Some Current Illusions, p. 26.) 
Admiral J ellicoe on treat1nent of seized vessels.-
Admiral J eUicoe, writ,ing o£ the operations o£ the British 
fleet, 1914-1916, says: 
The fate of the detained ship was decided in London on receipt 
of the report of examination. As was perhaps natural, the 
sentence on many ships' cargoes pronounced in London was not 
accepted without question frmn the Fleet, and a good deal of 
correspondence passed with reference to individual ships. \Ve, in 
the Fleet, were naturally very critical of any suspicion of laxity 
in passing, into neutral countries bordering on Germany, articles 
which we suspected might find their way into Germany, and 
constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the Admiralty, 
and, later, to the lVIinistry of Blockade, when that :Ministry was 
established. The difficulties with which the Foreign Office was 
faced in regard to neutral susceptib:lities were naturally not so 
apparent in the Fleet as to the authorities in London, and 
though many of our ~criticisms were perhaps son1ewhat unjusti-
fiable, and some possibly incorrect, it is certain that in the main 
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they were. of use. Indeed, they were welcomed in London as giv-
ing th~ n~v~J point of view. (The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916, p. 76: ) 
0 onvoy and certification.-On April 16, 1918, the 
Dutch lVIinister of Marine announced to the First Cham-
her that " the Government would send a convoy of Gov-
ernment passengers and goods to .the Nether lands East 
Indies." Mr. Balfour in a dispatch to the minister at 
The Hague said on April 25, 1918, that: 
You should let the Netherlands Government know that His 
Majesty's Govennnent of course do not recognise the "right of 
convoy," and that they will exercise the belligerent rights of visit 
and search of 1nerchant vessels· should the Netherlands Govern-
ment carry out their proposal. (Parlia1nentary Papers, Misc. 
No. 13 [1918], p. 4.) 
The Dutch, however, cont,inued their preparations and 
on April 29, 1918, the Netherlands Legation infotmed 
Mr. Balfour that: 
In connection with the decision of the Netherlands Government 
to send a convoy to the Dutch East Indies to relieve military men, 
and to send out Government officials with their families and some 
urgently needed military and other Government goods, I have the 
honour, in accordance with instructions received, to inform your 
Excellency that the said convoy will be composed of the following: 
1. Her Majesty's Hertog Hcn"drrik, accompanied by a coal boat 
requisitioned for that purpose, for the purpose of bunkering 
during the voyage. 
2. A Netherlands merchant ship, transformed into a man-of-war 
according to the rules of the VIIth Convention, 1917, for the 
transport of military n1en to the Dutch East Indies, having as 
cargo military stores. 
3. ·A Netherlands 1nerchant ship requisitioned by the Nether-
lands Governn1ent under convoy of the man-of-war mentioned 
sub 1 for the transport of Govern1nent passengers with their 
families, and having for cargo exclusively goods of the Nether-
lands Govern1nent destined for the Government of the Du~ch 
East Indies. 
The loading of all goods and the embarkation of all passengers 
·will be effected under strict supervision of Netherlands Govern-
ment officials. 
The passengers and their luggage will be submitted to a strict 
examina~ion. 
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No private correspondence may be carried. The ships carry 
neither ordinary nor parcel mail. . 
Of the Govern1nent goods, the usual 1nanifesto \Vill be pro-
duced with certificates of origin issued by the Inspector of Import 
Duties. 
I have been directed to add that it is intended to send the 
above convoy about the Iniddle of the month of June, and that 
·it will sail round the Scottish Isles and the Cape of Good Hope. 
(Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 13 [1918], p. 5.) 
Various delays occurred, but on May 31 a co1nmunique 
was issued by the Dutch explaining that: 
'Varships will therefore only carry naval personnel and war 
supplies, and l.he 1nerchant ships only Government passengers 
with their families and Governn1ent goods. It is not intended to 
institute under protection of warships commercial intercourse 
which, without such protection, would not be permitted by the 
belligerents according to their views of commercial liberty of 
neutrals. No mail will be carried. It is obvious that convoy 
commandant would not tolerate any examination of the con-
voyed ships. According to usage, he will, on meeting belligerent 
warships, permit perusal of cargo documents in his custody by 
com1nander at latter's request. In fact, those documents will be 
cmnm unica ted l. o Powers concerned before departure from Nether-
lands. As is custon1ary in these times when despatching warships 
with view to preventing n1isunderstanding in event of 1neeting 
belligerent warships, notice has . been given to Governments of 
belligerents of the despatch of the convoy. (Ibid. p. 7.) 
On June 7, 1918, in a note to the Dutch n1inister at 
London Mr. Balfour said: 
2. I t was therefore with considerable sun1rise that _I received 
on the 31st ultimo, by telegraph frmn Sir "\V. Townley, a trans-
lation of an official notice published in the Dutch press that 
n1orning by the Ministry of :Marine at The Hague, announcing 
an1ong other things that "the conunander of the convoy \vould 
not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships." 
3. In the face of this announcen1ent, so 1nade, His lVIajesty's 
Government feel com1Jelled to reiterate in the 1nost formal manner 
that the right of visit and search which Great Britain, whether 
she was a neutral or a belligerent, has, in conformity with the 
rules of internaaonal law, consistently upheld for centuries, is 
not one which she calL abandon. 
4. As the Netherlands Government is well aware, the claim 
that in1munity from search is conferred on neutral 1nerchant ves-
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sels by the fact of their sailing under the convoy of a man-of-war 
flying the national flag has never been conceded by this country. 
By the course, therefore, which they are now pursuing, they do 
in fact demand that Great Britain shall abdicate her belligerent 
right to stop contraband trade by the regulated exercise of naval 
force, and, in the middle of a great war, abandon the allied block-
·ade. This is a detnand to which Great Britain could not possibly 
.accede. (Ibid. p. 8.) 
After a lengthy me1norandu1n the British Government, 
ho·wever, waived its " right of visit and search in this 
particular case, as an act of courtesy " of an exceptional 
nature, and the following staternent of conditions \vas 
made: 
(a) A detailed list of all passengers sailing in the convoy, to 
be furnished to His :Majesty's Government, none but Dutch 
Govern1nent officials and their fa1nilies beiNg alfowed to proceed. 
(b) Full particulars of the cargo on board any merchant vessel 
·sailing in the convoy to be supplied in the same way as is now 
done by the Netherlands Oversea Trust in respect of ships under 
their control. 
(c) The Netherlands Government to give a forn1al guarantee 
that no goods shipped in the convoy are ·either wholly or in part 
·Of enemy origin. 
(d) The ships sailing under the Dutch naval flag, including 
the converted liner, not to carry any civilian passengers, nor any 
goods or articles other than warlike stores destined for the 
colonial authorities or forces, of \Vhich complete lists should be 
furnished. 
(e) No mails, correspondence, private pape1~s, printed nUttter, 
{)r parcels to be carried by any ship in the convoy (except offi-
cial despatches of' the Dutch Government). 
(f) The convoy not to sail until the above stipulated par-
ticulars and undertakings have been furnished and have been 
found satisfactory by the British authorities. (Ibid. p. 9.) 
The Dutch Legation at London in a ~1ote of June 15, 
1918, said: 
In reply to the note you w·ere good enough to address to 1ne 
()n the 7th instant, I have the honour to inform you, in accordance 
with instructions received, that the Netherlands Govenunent are 
pleased to see that both the British and the Netherlands Gov-
ernnlents agree as .to the mode of carrying out the plan for 
the convoy mentioned therein. The conditions sbited corresnonrl 
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almost identically with the intentions communicated in my note 
of the 29th April, last. A complete list of passengers had also 
been prepared, to be sent, together with full particulars of the 
cargoes, to all foreign Legations concerned, as the Netherlands 
Government wish to avoid ·even any possible impression that 
anything is being concealed. They can not agree with the point 
of view that their readiness to conform to the views of the 
belligerents of the liberty of neutral cmnmerce is difficult to 
reconcile with the \vbole plan of the convoy. The protection of 
the men-of-war has the advantage of excluding all unneces-sary 
delay. The Netherlands Government are fully aware that the 
British Government do not recognise the right of convoy upheld 
by the first-named Govern1nent and ali other nations, but,· in 
their opinion, this point of international law can be left out of 
account in the present case of a very special sort 'of convoy 
destined to transport between the mother-country and its colonies 
none but goods for the service of the Government and Government 
passengers, with tlieir families. (Ibid. p. 10.) 
This case involved official Government transport and 
a for1n of certification which was resorted to as a matter 
of convenience such as might often be found advanta-
geous by both parties. Mr. Balfou(s note o£ June 7 had 
referred particularly to neutral merchant vessels. 
The "Black Lists."-
Closely connected with the legal conc-eption of trading with the 
enemy, is the institution of the Statutory or ''Black Lists " initi-
ated for the first tilne in 1915 by Great Britain and France. All 
commercial intercourse by British and French citizens with the 
persons or firms included therein was strictly forbidden on ac-
count of the ene1ny nationality or hostile associations of such 
persons or firms. By section 1, subsection 3 of the Trading with 
the Enemy (Extension of Powers) Act, 1915, corrections and 
additions of further persons or finns to the Statutory Lists could 
he made by Order in Council, and were in fact so Ina de from time 
to time up to the· end of the war. 
In the case of Great Britain, the adoption of the ''Black Lists" 
was a distinct departure from the ordinarily and generally ac-
CE!pted criteria governing enen1y character. The individuals or 
corporations comprised in the lists with whmn intercourse by 
British subjects was rendered illegal as involving trading with 
the enemy, were persons or firn1s who, in the great majority of 
cases, were resident -or carrying on business in neutral countries. 
It would thus appear that, in so far at least as the "Black Lists" 
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were concerned, Great Britain was applying the test of nationality, 
and not the traditional criterion of domicile. (Colombos, Law of 
Prize, p. 224.) 
Proposal to prohibit. emport of contra:band.-At the 
rneeting o£ the American Society o£ International Law in 
1915, Professor Butte proposed that in time o£ war the 
export o£ contraband be prohibited by neutrals. He 
argued that: 
Under present conditions, the captor always acts on the pre-
suinption that. a neutral ship bound for an enen1y port or a 
neutral port near ene1ny territory is transporting contraband. 
Except when under convoy, such vessels carrying a 1nixed cargo 
are presu1ned guilty. Their innocence 1nust be established by a 
visit and search; their n1anifest and other papers have little 
or no probative value. Under 1nodern conditions, with large 
ships and large· miscellaneous cargoes, the search of each vessel 
consu1nes 1nany hours, and not infrequently can not be carried 
out on the high seas at all. The neutral ship is often taken into 
the belligerent's nearest port and detained there for days to be 
unloaded and reloaded, to the great damage and loss of neutral 
shippers and shipowners. So long as neutral states allow the 
export of contraband frmn their shores, it seems that they have 
no just grounds of complaint against a thorough search of each 
vessel intercepted by the belligerent, however long it may reason-
ably require and \vhatever the means that n1ay be reasonably 
necessary. The belUgerent 1nust obtain for hin~self the ass·urance 
that neutral states now fail or refuse to give. Surely the bellig-
erent would be glad to be relieved of the burden, the liability, and 
the endless difficulties and controversies with neutrals connected 
with the execution of these n1inute searches, if he had some 
assurance upon which he could rely that no contraband was put 
aboard ship in neutral ports. 
By the enforce1nent of such prohibitory statutes, neutral Inari-
tilne commerce would be safer, because the risk of confiscation of 
ships or of conden1nation to pay expenses and costs because of 
contraband found on board would be almost entirely eliminated; 
and delays and losses to a shipper of innocent goods in the same 
vessel would be avoided. A shipper of innocent goods can not 
feel safe under the existing rules and the uncertainties as to the 
doctrine of infection. How is he to know when he sends his 
goods on board (unless he owns the ship hhnself) whether con-
traband will be carried, and if so, what proportion by . value, 
weight, volume and freight of the whole cargo? And who knows 
• 
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what proportion in law infects the ship and renders it liable tQ 
confiscation? His goods may be thrown out at the first convenient 
port ; and it is incumbent upon hin1 to recover them and to reload 
and reship them, if he can find the space, at his own expense. He 
bas Iio recourse against the captol' for the interruption of his 
trade, the da1nage to. himself or his custmners, or for other losses 
by reason of the delay. In 1nany cases, €'specially if his goods 
are perishable, he is fortunate if he recovers a fraction of their 
value. 
Further, the prohibition of the export of contraband frmn 
neutral states would tend to restrain the belligerent from arbi-
trarily extending the list of contraband articles. (A1ner. Soc. 
Int. Law, Proceedings, 1915, p. 127.) 
17reaty provisions.-The United States has been a party 
to many treaties in \vhich certification in varying :for1ns 
has been recognized as in the treaty with Bolivia, 1858: 
ARTICLE XXII 
To avoid all kinds of vexation and abuse in the exa1ninat:on 
of the papers relating to the ownership of the vessels belonging to 
the citizens of the two contracting parties, they agree that, in 
case one of them should be engaged in ·war, the ships and vessels 
belonging to the citizens of the other must be furnished with 
sea-letters or passports, expressing· the name, property and bulk 
of the ships, as also the name and place of habitation of the 
\ 
master and commander of said vessel, in order that it may thereby 
appear that said ship truly belongs to the citizens of one of th~ 
parties; they likewise agree that such ships being laden, besides 
the ~aid sea-letters or passports, shall also be provided with cer-
tificates, containing the several particulars of the cargo, and the 
place whence the ship sailed, so that it n1ay be known whether 
any forbidden or contraband goods be on board the san1e; which 
certificates shall be n1ade out by the officers of the place \Yhence 
the ship sailed in the accustmned fonn; without such requisites 
said vessels may be detained, to be adjudged by the competent 
tribunal, and 1nay be declared legal prize, unless the said defect 
shall prove to be owing to accident, and supplied by testimony 
entirely equivalent. 
ARTICLE XXIII 
It is further agreed that the stipulations above expressed, 
relative to the visiting and examination of vessels, shall apply 
only to those which sail without convoy; and when said vessels 
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shall be under conYoy, the ve-rbal declaration of the commander 
·of the convoy, on his word of honor, that the vessels under 
h~s protection belong to the nation whose flag he carries, and,. 
when they are bound to an enemy's port, that they have no 
contraband goods on board, shall be sufficient. 
Other treaties contain identical or similar provisions: 
Brazil, 1828; Central A1nerica, 1825; Chile, 1832; Colom-
bia, 1824 and 1846; Dominican Republic, 1867; Ecuador,. 
1839; France, 1778 and 1800; Guatemala, 1849; Hayti, 
1864; Mexico,· 1831; Netherlands, 1782; Peru, 1851,, ~870, 
and 1880; Prussia, 1785 and 1799; Salvador, 1850 and 
1870; Spain, 1795; S·weden, 1783; Venezuela, 1836 and 
1860. 
0 ertification of ca:rgo.-'The treaty proYisions ·just 
n1entioned ·were aiined to secure regularity of papers 
and to a void unnecessary delays. The papers ·would 'to 
so1ne extent facilitate visit and search, but \Vould not 
necessarily exempt the vessels from seizure. 'l.'he alJ .... 
sence of such papers \Vould n1ake the vessel liable to be.· 
declar.ed prize. 
, Various propositions have been n1ade £ron1 time to 
time in regard to methods of avoiding ··· the inconvenience 
of visit .and search. _1\;fany of these plans have involved 
placing of additional obligations upon the neutral. ' Some 
of these contain obligations \vhich if not fulfilled by the· 
neutral state '\vould give rise to ne\V international di:f-
:ferences and 1vould place a part of the burden· o£ the 
war upon the neutral. Even if a neutral should be 
conscientious in investigating and certifying the cargo 
and character of a vessel about to leave port, such a ves-
sel might take on cargo after leaving port as has been 
the practice in the days of smuggling vvhen the rewards 
are great. It can not always be presumed that. ''th~ 
officers investigating and certifying to cargoes would 
not in so1ne countries yield to inducements to make false 
returns. Under the proposed systems the right to visit. 
and search \Vas to be reserved, thus placing the neutral 
under a new obligation merely without necessarily· 
relieving the vessel from any inconvenience. 
.38 GOODS ON NEUTRAL MERCHANT VESSEL 
Professor Hyde in commenting on certain aspects of 
the matters involved said: 
Doubtless latitude should be accorded a belligerent in attenlpt-
ing to check traffic in contraband, and to ascertain its existence 
on the high seas. The procedure, however, whereby innocent 
ships are forced to deviate from their courses, put into belliget·-
ent ports and there submit to protracted searches as. a means of 
indicating whether they or other vessels are participating in the 
war, or are about to do so, appears to be at variance with the 
demands of justice. 
The British argument and the facts which supported it indi-
cate why the· right of search as exercised in previous wars is in-
applicable to n1odern conditions. There is solid reason for the 
attempt to place within the reach of a belligerent, by some other 
process less injurious to innocent shipping, information concern-
ing the nature of neutral cargoes and the voyages of neutral 
vessels. It is believed that neutral governtnental certification of 
ships' papers would offer as reliable assurance as to facts. ascer-
tainable by search as could be furnished by a neutral con~oy. 
Moreover; the burden of making such certification might be fully 
compensated by benefits derived frotn the freedom from annoy-
ances under the systetn now prevailing. -General approval of a 
procedure establishing reasonable neutral guarantees effected 
through increasing governmental oversight of neutral commerce, 
may cause the exercise of the belligerent rights of visit and 
search to s.ink into a much desired desuetude. (2 Hyde, Int. Law, 
p. 444.) 
Doctor La-wrence had previously, as Professor Hyde 
indicates, raised this question when after reciting the 
facts as to the cases arising during the South African 
war Doctor Lawrence says: 
It is clear from the bare recital of these facts that in any 
future naval struggle carried on by powerful maritime states the 
position of neutrals possessed of a great mercantile marine will be 
intolerable. The only way of escape is to modify the right of 
search to such an extent that belligerents may obtain reasonable 
assurance of the innocence of harmless cargoes, without inflicting 
on neutrals the ruinous and humiliating process of deviation to a 
.belligerent port and a complete overhaul therein of all the vessel 
contains. The continuance of the existing state of things involves 
grave danger of a great extension of any naval war that may 
break out in the n~ar future. It is worthy of consideration 
whether smne system of official certificates could not be devised, 
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whereby neutral vessels could carry, if they chose, satisfactory 
assurances that their passengers and cargoes consisted only of 
the persons and goods set forth and described in their papers. 
A visiting belligerent officer could then decide whether to effect a 
capture or not, without the need of a preliminary search. (Prin-
ciples of Int. Law, 4th eel., p. 473.) 
Letters of as·su.ramce, 1917.-Lord Robert Cecil, Min-
ister o:f Blockade and Undersecretary o:f State :for For-
eign Affairs, said in the House o:f Commons, March 27, 
1917: 
There is one other device which I am going to describe to 
the !louse and which has really been of great assistance to 
the blockade. I should like to describe it, because I believe 
it to be the type of device which ought to be employed in a 
blockade of this description. About the time I was appointed, 
the Con~u.~-General of the United States came to -see me, and 
he pointed- out fo 1ne: "You say in your diplomatic representa-
tions to the United States that, after all, British goods suffer 
just as much as American goods frmn the blockade, and that 
we are not really injuring An1erican goods and American traders 
in any way beyond the. injury which the British trader suffers. 
That is not quite right, because the British trader can go to 
your vV ar Trade Department before he makes any arrange-
ments with regard to the shipping of the goods and he can 
obtain a licence. 'Vhen he has got his licence he knows that it 
is all right, and he can proceed to secure ship's space and make his 
financial arrangements. He is able to carry on his trade with-
out fear that it will be stopped at the last minute. That is 
not the case in the United States. Cannot you do something to 
supply that : ~ant·?" vVe thereppon organised a system of Let-
ters of Assurance as it is called, in the States. It is perfectly 
voluntary. Nobody need hike out letters of assurance unless 
he wishes to do so, but if he likes to go to our authorities there 
and make inquiries whether a particular ship is likely to meet 
with difficulty, he can obtain frmn those authorities in America 
letters of a·ssurance, and then the goods, generally speaking, 
unless something except:onal intervenes, go through without 
any trouble or difficulty. That device has been of enormous 
importance in smoothing the difficulties which had before then 
e~isted wjth America, and it. has been of equal importance in 
enabling tis· to know exactly what is going on in reference to 
exports from the ,United States to these neutral countries. It has 
enabled us, without any unfairness or injustice, to regulate the 
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supplies to these neutral countries. 
Con1mons, 9·2 H. C. Deb. 5 s., p. 254.) * 
(Parliamentary Debates,. 
* * 
I think the visit of the Consul-General to me took place rather-
more than a year ago, and I established this system as soon as it 
could be established. I should think it is about a year ago. It 
has taken some little tilne to get it in working order. It is 
entirely a voluntary S~7Stem, but now, though I do not say it is 
universal, it is very largely utilized by traders between the 
United States and neutral countries. In my judgment, as the 
result of these measures and other measures, because, of course,. 
they were accompanied by other measures of general tightening:-UP 
the various devices which before existed, there has been for some 
:tnonths past a complete cessation of overseas ilnportation into 
enemy countries. I 'vill give s01ne instances of that in a n1oment. 
My hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Peto) said that we 
had really done nothing, at any rate up to the summer or the 
third quarter of 1916, because we hacl not succeeded in stop-
ping the trade of what I will call, roughly, the home produce 
of these neighboring countries. I think he :tnust forget that 
right through the early stages the question of the home produce 
of neighboring neutrals was never raised. The whole question 
which was then discussed was, "Are you really stopping the 
overseas trade and the imports into Gerp1any?" That was ac-
complished completely, or substantially completely-nothing is 
complete in this world-about June or July of last year. l * * * 
I have had so:tne figures prepared. Three or four of them I 
do not think will do any injury to the State, at any rate, some 
of them will not. The form in which these figures have ~een 
prepared deals with the whole of the neutral countries-that is 
to say, the three Scandinavian countries and Holland, all in a 
lump. After all, that is the real test. If you can show that the 
impor~s into the whole of these countries have been reduced t() 
something about either just over or just under the pre-war 
normal figure, you n1ay fairly conclude that there is no con-
siderable direct import into the enemy country. * ~ * * 
I felt when we had succeeded in stopping all in1ports, apart 
from questions of smuggling and things of that kind-ail overseas 
imports-we still had not done all that was necessary in order to 
complete the blockade of Germany. There was the question of 
the home produce of the border neutrals. That is a much 1nore 
difficult subject to deal with, as 1ny ho:t~l. Friends who have spoken 
will realise. The foundation of a blockade is the prize ; that is · 
the sanction. An ordinary blockade entirely depends " upon it. 
You can only stop ship~ and goods going to a blockaded port 
'vhich are and can be conden1ned in a Prize Court. Where you 
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have to deal with a direct blockade, the 1natter is perfectly 
silnple. You n1erely have to ascertain that the ship ~s going to . 
a blockaded port and put it into a Prize Court, and, if you can 
prove that fact, the ship is condemned as a matter of course. 
The House is aware that that is no~ the problem with which we. 
haYe to deal here. We have to deal with an indirect blockade, 
that is, . a blockade through neutral countries. There the posi-
tion is much more difficult. You can stop and get condemned in a 
Prize Court any goods which are going into the neutral countries, 
the ulthnate destination of which is the enemy country. That is 
described in our text books as "continuous voyage," and I believe-
in the American text books it is described as the "doctrine of 
ultima~e destination." That is the point. We have acted to the· 
full on that doctrine, and have stopped all goods, the ultimate, 
destination of which was Germany or any enemy country. (Ibid. 
p. 258.) 
General.-It is evident .that the problem of ratio deter--
mining liability of a vessel to condemnation is not con-
fined to a single standard but may be value, vveight ~. 
volume, or freight charges of cargo. Doubt. 1nay easily 
arise as to any of these. Lists of named specific artieles, 
eontraband of war, may not include all articles 'vhich 
from their na.ture might be classed as contraband. The 
enumeration of categories such as food, fuel, clothing· 
may be inclusive though less definite. Foods consigned_ 
to order may be sent to a prize court. Some other con-
signments may be suspicious and receive si1n.ilar treat-
ment. The burden of proof of liability before the 'Vorld 
"'\Var rested, in general, on the captor. N a.turally the re-
lation of ports of neutral states to the means of com-
1nunication with belligerent states would influence the· 
opinion upon the probable ultimate dest.ina.tion of cargo 
upon a vessel that had been brought-to for visit and 
search. A certificate of a neutral official as to the inno-
cent character of the goods might not be regarded as 
proof of such character, as o.ther goods might have been 
taken on at sea or elsewhere after sailing. A letter of 
assurance from one belligerent might be a ground of· 
suspicion to the .other that there was some collusion_ 
between the shippers and the belligerent. 
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The responsibility for seizure must res.t upon the conl-
.Inander of the visiting vessel of war. While the master 
of a merchant vessel may consider that his vessel is 
exempt from seizure, the commander of the visiting vessel 
of war may have information not possessed by the master 
of a merchant vessel and suspicion justifies taking the 
merchant vessel before the prize court. 
In the situation as stated there are goods of such char-
acter that they may by well-known processes be converted 
into articles of special use in war and under mqdern con-
ditions .the immediate consignment to a neutral port 1uay 
have little significance in determining the ult,imate des-
t ination. Certification of innocent character and similar 
documents are not recognized as binding in internat,ional 
law. The master has good grounds for maintaining 
exemption from seizure, but these are not sufficient to 
p reclude seizure. 
SOLUTION 
The contentions of the master are not grounds suffi-
cient to exempt the merchant vessel from ljability to 
seizure. 
